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Political Gerrymandering: A Statutory
Compactness Standard as an Antidote
for Judicial Impotence
For more than a century the right to cast a vote has been protected
against invidious discrimination.1 In 1962 the Supreme Court considered
for the first time the quality of that vote2 and two years later proclaimed
a goal of "fair and effective representation of all citizens." 3 The Court
has articulated the first prerequisite of fair and effective representation:
"one man's vote... is to be worth as much as another's."' 4 Recently the
Court recognized that even where votes are equally weighted, political
gerrymandering5 denies fair and effective representation if it is de-
signed to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of identifiable
racial or political groups.6 It is not clear, however, whether the Court
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. XV. See also, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
2 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
4 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). The Court has made clear the absolute nature
of that requirement as applied to congressional districts. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783
(1973); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
5 Gerrymandering has been defined as "discriminatory districting which operates to in-
flate unduly the political strength of one group and deflate that of another." Dixon, The
Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote," 1969 Sup. CT. REv.
219, 255. Racial and ethnic gerrymandering are subcategories of political gerrymandering;
their ultimate purpose is always political. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594, 612
(5th Cir. 1959) (Wisdom, J., concurring), rev'd, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
6 See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143
(1971); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184 n.2 (1971); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439
(1965). At best, "one person, one vote" has merely given equal numbers of people access to a
representative. Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny,
1973 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 22; Irwin, Representation and Election: The Reapportionment Cases in
Retrospect, 67 Micr. L. REv. 729, 747 (1969); see Opinion to the Governot, 101 R.I. 203, 208,
221 A.2d 799, 802 (1966). At worst, it has increased use of gerrymandering. Wells v. Rockefel-
ler, 394 U.S. 542, 555 (1969) (White, J., dissenting); Baker, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanc-
tuay or Next Judicial Target?, in RFAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s, at 135, 140 (N. Polsby
ed. 1971); Dixon, Computers and Redistricting: A Plea for Realism, 2 RUTGERS J. CoM-
PuruPs & LAw 15, 16 (1971); Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man, One- Vote," 46
N.Y.U.L. REv. 879, 880 (1971); Elliott, Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes Un-
bound: The Political Consequences of Reapportionment, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 474, 482-83
(1970); Comment, Apportionment and the Courts-A Synopsis and Prognosis: Herein of
Gerrymanders and Other Dragons, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 500, 518-19 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Apportionment and the Courts]. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964), the
Court, in discussing state legislative reapportionment, conceded that "[i]ndiscriminate dis-
tricting, without any regard foK political subdivision or natural or historical boundary
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will disapprove for gerrymandering when the voting strength of a
readily identifiable political group is not substantially reduced.
7
This comment will attempt to define the concept of fair and effective
representation and show that gerrymandering results in denial of such
representation. The comment suggests that, even under a broad judicial
examination of redistricting, practical problems of proof and the
need for appropriate deference to legislative judgments make the courts
an ineffective forum for preventing the harms resulting from many
types of gerrymandering. Congress, however, can create a standard for
minimizing gerrymandering of congressional districts.8 A mathemati-
cally defined standard of compactness would provide an effective and
easily understandable criterion to guide apportionment decisions and
judicial review of those decisions.
I. THE IDEAL OF FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
A. The Concept of Individual Interests
Although the Supreme Court has indicated that fair and effective
representation is the goal of its redistricting decisions,9 it has rarely
analyzed that concept.10 An individual's right to representation is fun-
lines may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering," but never-
theless maintained "[w]hatever the means of accomplishment, the overriding objective
must be substantial equality of population."
Before 1973, many lower federal courts had held gerrymandering of single-member dis-
tricts nonjustidable. E.g., Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 322 F. Supp. 428, 434 (N.D.
I1.), rev'd, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972); Sincock v. Gately, 262
F. Supp. 789, 833 (D. Del. 1967); Bush v. Martin, 251 F. Supp. 484, 513 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
In Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973), however, the Court made it dear that
the issue "is not wholly exempt from judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment."
7 Compare Gaffley v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971), with White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
8 This comment is limited to the problem of gerrymandering of congressional districts.
State legislative apportionment involves different considerations and may require a differ-
ent solution to gerrymandering. For example, state legislative districts are more numerous
and substantially smaller in area than congressional districts, thereby increasing the im-
portance of geographic factors and political subdivision lines. See Mahan v. Howell, 410
U.S. 815 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971). Because there are more state repre-
sentatives per population unit, proportional representation might be more effective in
giving representation to small interest groups. The argument for trying to represent local
interests in state legislative districts is thus stronger because national issues are less likely
to dominate state elections. Finally, unlike congressional redistricting, state legislative dis-
trict lines are drawn by those who will run from those districts, thereby increasing the
incentives to gerrymander.
9 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
10 See Casper, supra note 6, at 2. Professor Casper notes that the Court is moving in the
direction of "viewing representation as a concept which needs further clarification." Id.
at 32.
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damentally a right to have his interests and views represented." The
Court, by recognizing only the interests advocated by well-defined
groups, has in effect dealt with only the broadest parameters of view-
points-for example, "black interests" deemed to be possessed by
Black people' 2 or "Republican views" deemed to be held by people
who have usually voted for Republican candidates. 3 The concept of
fixed groups committed to broad, ideological interests, however, is not
consistent with present realities or the historic ideals of the American
political system.
American political life traditionally has been viewed as nonideolog-
ical. Broad questions concerning the structure of government and
society have occasionally been the focus of political concern, but
in general there has been a fundamental consensus on such matters.
The primary focus of political concerns has been on specific issues of
day-to-day policy that affect the interests of nonideological factions.14
Representation of these individual concerns has been the ideal of
American representative democracy.15 To represent fully the concerns
of his constituency, a representative must not be merely an agent whose
opinions match those of some ideological majority in his district, he
must be attuned to a diversity of interests.16 An individual wishing to
advocate his views will usually join with others of similar interests.
Indeed, a view must be shared by a number of people before it carries
weight in any democratic community. The ideal, however, envisions
a great number of potentially influential groups and freedom of move-
11 See generally H. PrrmN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); Pennock Political
Representation: An Overview, in REPRESENTATION (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1968).
12 See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971).
13 See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
14 See D. BooRSTm, THE GENIUS OF AMfyERICAN POLITICS 1-7 (1953); L. HAIRTZ, TE
LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 3-32 (1955); BANFIELU, In Defense of the American Party
System, in PoLcrrAL PARTIES, U.S.A. 21-39 (R. Goldwin ed. 1964). Alexis deTocqueville,
perhaps the shrewdest observer of American politics, noted that "In the absence of great
parties, the United States swarm with lesser controversies; and public opinion is divided
into a thousand minute shades of difference upon questions of detail." A. DETocQUEv=LLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AsmucA 89 (R. Heffner ed. 1956).
15 See A. DETocQuEvm.LE, supra note 14, at 89-90.
16 The nature of the issues that animate American politics also affects the repre-
sentative's role in the parliamentary process. Parliamentary interaction among representa-
tives does not consist of pitched battles along sharply drawn ideological lines. Coalition
building-realignment of political configurations in an almost constant state of mutation-
is the essence of the process. A representative heavily committed to an ideological posi-
tion arising from a politically homogeneous constituency has little incentive to engage
in the political trade offs necessary to the coalition-building process, and a parliamentary
body in which many members represent homogeneous constituencies dominated by ideo-
logical interests would be incapable of sustaining a flexible coalition-building process.
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ment among them, thereby allowing an individual to obtain represen-
tation of his own diversity of views. Although the individual is likely
to be committed to a group whose views he does not completely share,
a wide variety of influential groups and continual restructuring of
groups and coalitions allows the individual to ally himself with what-
ever group represents the views he regards as most important at any
given time. At times relatively stable groups will form that represent
a significant percentage of the relevant electorate. Racial and ethnic
minorities, for example, have often formed such groups.1 7 These views
must be represented, but where such a group has a controlling voice
in elections for an extended period of time, either alone or in com-
bination with a small number of other stable groups, a representative
supported by the controlling group is able to maintain his position
without ever considering the interests of those in the community who
do not share the controlling group's views.18
B. Designing Congressional Districts to Serve the Ideal
1. Politically Competitive Districts. In order to achieve this ideal of
effective representation, legislatures should be apportioned so as to
minimize the extent to which any representative is able to rely solely
on a single interest group for his support. A competitive election in a
district with diverse interests requires candidates to try to build suc-
cessful electoral coalitions by granting concessions to potentially hostile
groups. 19 The creation of a coalition thus provides access to power for
those groups incapable of electing a representative committed solely
to their viewpoints.20 The advantages of the politically competitive dis-
trict are brought into sharper focus by an examination of the major
alternative, proportional representation.
2. Proportional Representation Districts. Many have argned that
effective representation is better achieved by proportional representa-
tion in either single- or multi-member districts, than by politically
17 See E. BANFIELD 9- J. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 89-94, 134-37 (1963).
18 The greatest denial of fair representation, therefore, occurs when 51 percent of the
relevant voting population belongs to a stable interest group and the remaining 49 percent
are of diverse interests. If the 49 percent represent a competing group, they might be able
to threaten the dominant group. Where there is a diversity of interests among those not
part of the controlling group, however, they are not needed in an electoral coalition nor
can they pose a substantial threat to the dominant group.
19 V.O. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES AND PREssuRE GRouPs 568 (1946); Auerbach, The Reappor-
tionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 55.
It has been noted that such a process exerts a moderating influence on the representative.
A. MILNOR, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL STABILITY 34-35 (1969); Jewell, Political Patterns in
Apportionment, in THE POLITICS OF REAPPORTION.-EUNT 26 (M. Jewell ed. 1962).
20 A. MILNOR, supra note 19, at 99; see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 150 (1971).
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competitive single-member districts.21 The purpose of proportional
representation-to provide an arithmetical reflection in the legislature
of all numerically significant sets of political opinions and interests in
the electorate22 -is often considered synonymous with increasing the
representation of political minorities. 23 Proportional representation,
in its pure sense, requires multi-member districts. 24 It is being sug-
gested with increasing frequency, however, that the drawing of single-
member district lines to ensure that certain minorities will be success-
ful in electing one of their own achieves the spirit, if not the mathe-
matical exactitude, of proportional representation. 25 It is questionable,
21 See, e.g., C. HOAG & G. HALIETr, JR., PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (1926); J. HOGAN,
ELErON AND REPRESENTATION (1945). The most popular system of proportional representa-
tion in the United States has been that proposed by Thomas Hare. T. HARE, ELEC ON OF
REPRE ENTATIVES (1865). Under Hare's system, three or more representatives are chosen from
the same district, with the distinctive feature of the transferable vote. On his ballot, each
voter ranks the candidates in accordance with his preferences. When a candidate receives
first-choice ballots in excess of the amount needed for election, the excess ballots are then
distributed to the second choices indicated on them, and so on. This system is thought
desirable because of the close mathematical relationship of voting to representation, and the
guarantee of minority representation. See C. HOArG & G. HALLETr, JR., supra, at 90-110.
Although such a system has never been utilized in an American congressional election, it
has been tried and rejected in many state and city elections. See E. BANFIELD & J. WILsoN,
supra note 17, at 96.
22 Proportional representation of political parties has been suggested as a way of guar-
anteeing that a state-wide majority of voters elect a majority of a state's congressmen. See
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 677 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.'735 (1973). That position, however,
ignores the fact that political parties are generally conglomerations of diverse interest
groups. To give a party a number of seats proportionate to its state-wide strength would
still render many interest groups inside and outside the party unable to elect their own
representative. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S.
752, 763 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting).
23 See Auerbach, supra note 19, at 26, 35; E. BANFELD & J. WILSON, supra note 17, at 97;
V.O. KEY, supra note 19, at 565. See also Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S.
713, 749 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
24 In Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971), the Court declared that single-member
districts are preferable to multi-member districts. It is clear, however, that multi-member
districts are not per se unconstitutional, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142 (1971);
Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), and are permissible where they afford minorities a greater
opportunity for participation in the political processes than single-member districts.
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1308 (5th Cir. 1975).
25 See Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964);
Beans v. Erdahl, 349 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D. Minn. 1972); Clinton, Further Explorations in the
Political Thicket: The Gerrymander and the Constitution, 59 Iowa L. REv. 1, 43-44 (1973);
Note, Compensatory Racial Reapportionment, 25 STAN. L. REv. 84 (1972). Indeed, pro-
viding representation to factions that might otherwise not be able to elect a member of
their group under a single-member system has been referred to as "[t]he principal justifi-
cation for gerrymandering." Edwards, supra note 6, at 896; see Dixon, supra note 5, at
251. But see text and notes at notes 29-31 infra.
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however, whether the assured election of a chosen representative of
every interest group of substantial size will promote truly effective rep-
resentation. 26
The major drawback of proportional representation in multi-member
districts is that it reduces the need for coalition building and interplay
among interests at the electoral level.27 Although multi-member dis-
tricts may give representation to minorities previously unable to elect
a representative devoted solely to their cause, the very fact that the
minority obtains an exclusive representative shifts any interplay to the
parliamentary level. At that level, each representative will view his role
as spokesman for his group rather than as a legislator representing
more diversified interests. Often it is minorities themselves that will
be harmed by this creation of conflict and ideological debate at the
parliamentary level. 28
Single-member districts drawn to guarantee minority representation
create several additional problems. Proponents of systems that guaran-
tee certain interest groups an exclusive representative must first make
the difficult decision of which interests are entitled to be represented.29
Even if it were possible to choose such an interest fairly and to identify
the voters allied to that interest, there is no reason to believe that
those voters will view the selected interest as transcending in importance
all their other economic and social views. Many voters may not wish to
have the interest be the basis for selection of a representative 30 and will
either refuse to vote on the basis of the chosen interest (in which case
the system does not work) or will vote the interest because they feel
"locked in" (in which case the system denies representation to their
other interests). Where a majority of the voters do vote on the basis of
the selected interest, groups representing other interests will be rele-
gated to permanent minority status and may lose their incentive for
political activism. The group that represents the chosen interest also
may lose its incentive to maintain close contact with the voters, be-
cause it is guaranteed continuing success. Viewed from a state-wide per-
spective, such a scheme may have the additional defect of "wasting"
minority votes in a district in which they are not needed.3 1
26 See generally G. HoRwIL, PROPORTIONAL REPRE-SENTATION (1925).
27 See generaly Baker, supra note 6, at 148; Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of
Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 252, 280.
28 See V.O. KEY, supra note 19, at 568; Auerbach, supra note 19, at 49; Neal, supra note
27, at 280-81. See also note 16 supra.
29 See Eulau, Wahke, Buchanan, & Ferguson, The Role of the Representative: Some
Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 742, 747
(1959).
30 See Auerbach, supra note 19, at 38.
31 Cf. Note, Compensatory Racial Reapportionment, supra note 25, at 85. See generally
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Thus, both types of proportional representation reduce the need for
coalition building and interplay at the electoral level, and single-mem-
ber districts effectively exclude divergent groups from the political
process. Districts designed to guarantee proportional representation to
identifiable political groups are not constitutionally required.3 2 The
Constitution guarantees to each interest group an equal right to par-
ticipate in the political system-not electoral victory. Politically com-
petitive districts best promote the responsiveness needed for fair and
effective representation. It remains to determine how gerrymandering
impairs this representational ideal.
C. The Harm Inflicted by Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering is based on the identification of stable groups that,
if they constitute a majority of the district, can elect a representative
without creating a coalition. The goal of gerrymandering is to create
a districting plan that facilitates the retention of seats by incumbents
or allowi the political group in power to enlarge the number of seats
it holds.33 Providing incumbents with safe seats is generally accom-
plished by giving them as large a majority as possible and by not plac-
ing more than one incumbent in the same district.84 The interest
groups that can be expected to support each incumbent are identified
and the districts structured accordingly. This form of gerrymandering
is most common where the apportioning legislature is not controlled
by any single group;3 5 such a plan benefits incumbents from opposing
political groups by providing them with stable majorities in different
districts. Where one party or group controls apportionment, it may
increase its strength by concentrating the major opposition in a few
districts while drawing each remaining district to provide a clear
majority for itself.30
Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533
(1969).
32 See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124,
153-55 (1971); Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 843 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 893 (1972); Kelly v. Bumpers, 340 F. Supp. 568, 583-84 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 413 U.S.
901 (1973).
33 See de Grazia, General Theory of Apportionment, 17 LAw & CoTEMP. PROB. 256,
262 (1952); Jewell, supra note 19, at 16; Nagel, Computers: The Law and Politics of Re-
districting, 2 RUTGERs J. COMPUTERs & LAw 22, 34 (1971).
34 Nagel, supra note 33, at 34.
35 For example, this was the situation in Illinois in 1964. See Jewell, supra note 19, at 16.
36 In theory, the most efficient gerrymander would produce many districts in which
voters supporting those responsible for the redistricting would be a bare majority of the
electorate. In practice, however, no controlling group is completely confident of its con-
tinuing support or its estimated strength; "comfortable majorities" or "calculated land-
slides" are therefore the rule in most districts. A. HACKER, CONGREssIONAL DISTMcrING 47
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In almost every case, therefore, gerrymandering creates safe dis-
tricts. This tactic diminishes effective representation by decreasing the
number of politically competitive districts37 and by reducing the effec-
tiveness of the franchise through a reduction in the number of voters
whose vote can affect the outcome.38
Political gerrymandering affects the quality of representation in an-
other sense. In a safe district, where victory is guaranteed, the control-
ling party is not forced to select its best candidate and may use the seat
as a reward for the party faithful.39 Incumbents may be able to con-
tinue in office without accounting to the voters in any significant way.40
Although a potential primary challenge may compel a degree of re-
sponsiveness, a primary is generally a less adequate forum than a gen-
eral election for raising important political issues. 41 Most important,
gerrymandered districts minimize the need to fuse various small or
single-issue groups into an electoral coalition, thus removing the only
significant opportunity for those groups to be heard.
II. INEFFECTIVENESS OF JUDICIAL REMzEDIES TO COMBAT
GERRYMANDERING
Although political gerrymandering reduces the effectiveness of repre-
sentation, it is unclear to what extent it is unconstitutional. One view is
that only gerrymandering schemes that substantially close off a well-
defined interest group's access to the electoral process are unconstitu-
tional.42 Under this view, the Constitution would not prohibit schemes
(1963). These principles are well illustrated by the 1962 New York election, in which the
Republican Party elected 51 percent of the state's congressmen with 49 percent of the
two-party vote. In eight out of twenty winning races, the Democrats had from 70.1 percent
to 80.8 percent of the votes; in the twenty-one Republican districts, the winner's highest
percentage was 68.3. The average Democratic majority was 64.6 percent, while the average
Republican figure was 60.8 percent. Id. at 55-57.
37 See Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F. Supp. 139, 149 (D. Conn.), rev'd sub nom., Gaffney
v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
38 Baker, supra note 6, at 130; Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1228, 1283
(1966).
39 See A. MILNOR, supra note 19, at 108-09.
40 Cf. Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 117-18 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Casper, supra
note 6, at 12; Jewell, supra note 19, at 27-28. In congressional accountability varies in-
versely with the number of successful incumbents, the current situation may already be
serious. The percentage'of freshmen in the Ninety-first Congress, for example, was 9.2-
the lowest in American history. Mayhew, Congressional Representation: Theory and
Practice in Drawing the Districts, in RrAPPORTioNMjNT IN THE 1970s at 249, 259 (N. Polsby
ed. 1971).
41 See C. EWING, PRIMARY ELECTIONS IN THE SouTH (1953); V.0. KEY, SoUmmu PoLrTnCS
ch. 19 (1949).
42 See generally Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 634 (1944).
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that merely dilute access, and the burden would fall on Congress to
minimize the opportunities for state legislatures to impose such abuses.
The other view of the Constitution's protections is that fair and effec-
tive representation is absolutely guaranteed,43 and only insignificant
deviations from that concept are constitutionally permissible.
The Supreme Court has traditionally struck down only gerrymander-
ing schemes that substantially denied access to identifiable political
groups.44 It has been suggested that the second, more absolutist view
should be adopted by the Court;45 it is questionable, however, whether
the courts can provide an adequate forum for the enforcement of the
more absolutist view. Although subtle cases of gerrymandering would
be justiciable, 46 practical difficulties in proving a dilution of fair and
effective representation, problems in making the possibly required
showing of a legislative intent to discriminate, and the basic necessity
for deferring to justifiable legislative decisions might still prevent the
courts from remedying all but the most flagrant instances of gerry-
mandering.
A. Difficulties in Proving the Prima Facie Case
Even under the more absolutist doctrine, the plaintiff must be able
to prove some denial of fair and effective representation. In Whitcomb
v. Chavis 47 and White v. Regester,48 the Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff may show such a denial by establishing that because of the
redistricting plan he, and persons sharing his interests, "had less oppor-
tunity than did the other residents in the district to participate in the
43 The right of qualified voters "to cast their votes effectively ... rank[s] among our
most precious freedoms." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); see Allen v. State Bd.
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). The
Court's choice in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), of population over territorial repre-
sentation as the ultimate constitutional requirement was, in essence, a decision that only
population-based representation could be fair and effective. Whether required by Article I,
Section 2 or the fourteenth amendment, "one person, one vote" has since been referred to
as a constitutional requirement based on the guarantee of fair and effective representation
for all citizens. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 792-93 (1973); White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748 (1973).
44 The Court has invalidated only reapportionment schemes that intentionally precluded
the right of Blacks to vote in a given election, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960),
or that substantially blocked the access of certain racial and ethnic groups to participation
in the political process, White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
45 See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 25. See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 171 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
46 See note 6 supra.
47 403 US. 124 (1971).
48 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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political processes and to elect legislators of their choice." 49 The Court
appears also to require a showing that the legislature intended to dis-
criminate against the plaintiff and his group in drawing the redistrict-
ing plan.50 Both elements of proof are extremely difficult to establish ex-
cept where the gerrymander is directed against a clearly identifiable and
stable group.
1. Proving Denial of Fair and Effective Representation. Where a
plaintiff has proved that his district is controlled by a stable political
group or coalition whose interests do not coincide with his interests, he
has shown that he is less represented than the supporters of the con-
trolling group. This proof, however, is insufficient to demonstrate a
denial of fair and effective representation. The plaintiff must also show
that, if the districts had been drawn differently, his representation
would have been greater. Such proof will almost always require evi-
dence that an interest group of which the plaintiff is a member would
have been part of an influential coalition.5 1 Proof of membership in a
group that would be better represented under a different plan is diffi-
cult where an individual seeks protection for the representation of in-
terests that are not readily identifiable. Even if the plaintiff can demon-
strate that he would be better represented if the districts had been
structured differently, the court would have to consider the impact of
alternative plans on voters in the entire area being districted. There
may be instances where it is impossible to draw a districting plan that
does not create some districts in which a single group dominates. Proof
that the plaintiff's political group does not have congressional seats in
proportion to its voting potential will therefore fall short of establish-
ing a prima facie case.5 2
In White v. Regester,53 it was alleged and proven "that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open
to participation" by the plaintiff's group. In that case, however, there
49 Id. at 766. On the central importance of the opportunity to participate in the political
process, see Casper, supra note 6, at 26-29; Clinton, supra note 25, at 19.
50 See text and notes at notes 58-63 infra.
51 If the plaintiff is the only person holding his views, only the unlikely possibility of a
completely fragmented district with very few stable interest groups will give him repre-
sentation.
52 See text and note at note 32 supra. But see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964);
Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F. Supp. 602, 606-07 (E.D. Penn. 1971); Dixon, supra note 5, at
267. Similarly, other standards of measurement are likely to conflict or be inconclusive.
Indeed, it is often difficult to determine whether a given interest group is helped or hin-
dered by a redistricting plan. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), noted in 24
RuTGrts L. Rv. 521, 538-41 (1970); Apportionment and the Courts, supra note 6, at 531.
53 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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was a history of racial discrimination in the voting process, and the
multi-member districts established by the apportionment plan, in con-
junction with a variety of state rules and procedures, substantially ex-
cluded Blacks and Mexican-Americans from the electoral process. The
Constitution impels special sensitivity to racial exclusions, 54 and in
Regester it was possible to prove that a different districting plan would
not have caused this exclusion. Similarly, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,55
an Alabama state law transformed the City of Tuskegee from a square
shape into "an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure," and excluded from
the city district all but four or five of the city's four hundred Black
voters. It was not difficult to prove that an alternative form of district-
ing would have given more equal representation to an identifiable set
of political interests.
The difficulties of proof absent such a clear showing of discrimina-
tion are exemplified by the multi-member district cases. Thus, al-
though the Supreme Court has recognized that a multi-member district
might "operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial
or political elements of the voting population,"56 it has found such a
plan unconstitutional only where there was substantial evidence of
discrimination against the identifiable group at other points in the
electoral process. 5 Where the group discriminated against is not easily
identifiable, the ability to prove that an alternative plan would increase
the group's power in the coalition-building process will be very rare.
If establishing dilution of representation is further dependent on proof
of other forms of discrimination, judicial remedies for subtle forms of
gerrymandering become virtually unobtainable.
2. Proof of intent to discriminate. In Wright v. RockefellerS8 the
Court held that the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof be-
cause he had not established that the legislature was motivated by racial
54 Perhaps the most important difference between racial and other political gerry-
mandering is that the fourteenth amendment was adopted with the special intent of pro-
tecting Blacks. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Thus, "the
Constitution itself requires a distinction between the familiar political abuse of gerry-
mandering and gerrymandering for the purpose of racial discrimination." Sims v. Baggett,
247 F. Supp. 96, 105 (M.D. Ala. 1965). But see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153-55
(1971); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965); Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466
F.2d 830, 847--50 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972); R.
DIXON, JR., DEMiOcRATIC REPRESENTATION 475 (1968); Apportionment and the Courts, supra
note 6, at 535.
55 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
56 Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
57 See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
58 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
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considerations in enacting the reapportionment plan under challenge.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, found that the effect of drawing the bound-
ary between two particular congressional districts was "to bring into the
Eighteenth district and keep out of the Seventeenth as many Negroes
and Puerto Ricans as possible."'5 9 He concluded that "[r]acial segrega-
tion that is state sponsored should be nullified whatever may have been
intended." 60
The Court has vacillated on this question,6' but a finding of intent
to discriminate appears to be necessary to invalidate a redistricting
plan.62 Intent to discriminate may be provable in some instances-for
example, in cases of racial discrimination, 63-but intent is unlikely to
be provable where the group discriminated against is simply "those
who do not support the controlling party in a safe district."
B. Deference to Legislative Judgments
Even if the requirement of intent is not imposed and the plaintiff is
able to prove a denial of representation, such a showing will not be
dispositive; the court must determine whether it should defer to the
legislature's judgment that the proposed plan is the best possible."
59 Id. at 60-61.
60 Id. at 61. Mr. Justice Goldberg, also dissenting, observed that all three judges below
required different showings of intent. Id. at 67.
61 For cases apparently holding that an intent to discriminate is a prerequisite to a
finding of unconstitutionality, see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 58 (1964); Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 841
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972). For authorities suggesting that only the effect
is critical, see Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,
439 (1965); Clinton, supra note 25, at 40-41; Note, Political Gerrymandering: The Law and
Politics of Partisan Districting, 36 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 144, 160-61 (1967).
02 See Note, Compensatory Racial Reapportionment, supra note 25, at 92-96. Although
it might be argued that such a requirement is necessary to protect plans where some "safe"
districts are unavoidable, the plaintiff must already show that the dilution could be
avoided by an alternative plan in order to make out a prima fade case.
63 See, e.g., Comillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
64 Recent developments in equal protection analysis require the Court to subject all
but a small minority of legislative classifications to what may be termed a rigorous rational-
ity test. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L REv.
1 (1972); Note, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40
U. Cm. L. REv. 807, 817-22 (1973); Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protec-
tion: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. Ri',. 1489, 1505-09 (1972); Note, Legislative Purpose,
Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 124 (1972).
It appears that the Warren Court's minimal review will still be applied when strictly
economic rights are involved. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 US. 356
(1973) (taxation); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (certain commercial matters);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (social
welfare benefits). But cf. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Goldberg
The University of Chicago Law Review
Deference to legislative decisions in this area is appropriate for two
reasons. First, it is extremely difficult for a court to set up standards by
which to judge whether a districting plan, taken as a whole, achieves
maximum representation for all groups. Where the court is in doubt, it
should defer to legislative decisions rather than usurp the legislative
role; any other approach would entangle the courts in political con-
siderations that cannot be appropriately handled through the judicial
process. Judicial review of gerrymandering differs markedly from, for
example, the easily quantifiable standard set up by the "one person,
one vote" decisions. Review of legislative attempts to meet that stand-
ard did not create many doubts as to whether a more effective plan
could be constructed.
The second reason for judicial deference arises from the fact that the
relative importance of the many interests that combine to guide a plan
must be evaluated first by the state legislatures. The state's interests
may include facilitation of voter participation, promotion of the party
system, compensation for past discrimination, and maintenance of
traditional political and geographic subdivisions. Given the wide range
of possibly justifiable legislative judgments present in redistricting, it
is understandable that the Court has required proof of an-intent to dis-
criminate. 65 Intentional discrimination is the one state interest that un-
questionably does not justify a diminution of fair and effective repre-
sentation.
Appropriate deference does not constitute a decision that gerry-
mandering cases are nonjusticiable because of a lack of standards by
which to judge such cases.66 Rather, the deference represents a recog-
nition that the selection of a plan that maximizes fair and effective
representation and the determination of when important state inter-
ests require alterations of that plan is for the legislature, unless there
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Strict review will continue to be applied to the suspect clas-
sifications established by the Warren Court, see, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972) (race), and to restrictions on rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (freedom of speech);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting rights).
Under the rigorous rationality approach, the legitimacy of the state interests is rigor-
ously examined, see, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 488 (1972), and the endangered per-
sonal rights are balanced against the importance of the state interests, see, e.g., Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). The court will also de-
termine whether it is possible to achieve the same end through less onerous means. See,
e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1978).
65 See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971).
66 Compare Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 785 (1973), and White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755 (1978), with Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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is clear proof of an unjustifiable impairment of fair and effective rep-
resentation.
The difficulty of proving a diminution of fair and effective repre-
sentation and intent to discriminate through political gerrymandering,
combined with the proper judicial deference for legislative judgments,
make the courts an ineffective forum for the redress of the harms of
political gerrymandering. It is open to the Congress, however, to create
a general standard for districting that minimizes the possibilities of
political gerrymandering by the state legislatures and yet is enforceable
in the courts. It is suggested that a compactness standard is appropriate
to such a purpose. 67
III. DEVELOPING A LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE
It has been noted that maximizing fair and effective representation
requires legislative decisions that evaluate each district within each
plan. A guide of general application must therefore be constructed
as a prophylactic measure that will minimize political gerrymandering
rather than attempt to define the absolute maximum of representa-
tion. The standard must be one that legislatures and courts can use
conveniently in formulating and reviewing reapportionment plans.68
67 Congressional power to enact a compactness statute is derived from Article I, section
4 of the Constitution, which specifically authorizes Congress to enact regulations regarding
congressional elections or to alter rules enacted by the state legislatures. Wells v. Rocke-
feller, 311 F. Supp. 48, 57 (S.D.N.Y.) (Cannella, J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 398 U.S. 901
(1970). Note, Congress in the Thicket: The Congressional Districting Bill of 1967, 36 G~o.
WAsH. L. REv. 224 (1967). Based on this constitutional grant, Congress enacted various
redistricting requirements for the period from 1842 until 1929. See Wood v. Broom, 287
U.S. 1, 6 (1932); note 71 infra. Throughout those years, there were no court challenges to
the statutes. Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1961 Sup.
Cr. REv. 194, 216.
In 1967, Congress indicated that the passage of a "compact and contiguous" standard
may be within reach. The House of Representatives passed a bill that required districts
to be composed of "contiguous territory in as compact a form as the State finds practicable."
H.R. 2508, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. RaG. 11089 (1967). According to those who sup-
ported stronger legislation, the last five words made the provision nonjusticiable in the
federal courts. The Senate passed the measure with the last five words deleted. 113 CONG.
REc. 15244 (1967). The conference report, R. Rep. No. 435, 113 CONG. Rac. 17509 (1967),
which was passed in the House, 113 CONG. Rac. 30251 (1967), and defeated in the Senate,
113 CONG. REc. 31712 (1967), retained the language of the House bill.
68 It has been suggested that computer-programmed district lines may be the best an-
swer to the search for objectivity in redistricting. See, e.g., Symposium on Legislative Re-
apportionment, 2 RuTGRs J. COMPUTERs & LAW 13 (1971); Weaver & Hess, A Procedure of
Non-Partisan Districting: Development of Computer Techniques, 73 YALE L.J. 288 (1963).
Use of computers, however, does not diminish the necessity for developing an appropriate
standard. Baker, supra note 6, at 139; Dixon, supra note 6, at 17. See also Ely v. Klahr,
403 U.S. 108 (1971).
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The most neutral, practical standard is a mathematically defined com-
pactness requirement. 9
A. Compactness as a Districting Standard
Some state7" and federal71 laws have set up a compactness criterion,
but these laws have failed to create an objective, mathematical stand-
ard by which to evaluate compactness. The effectiveness of compactness
laws has been further impaired by the use of limiting phrases such as
"as compact as practicable"72 or "as compact as may be."' 73 The limiting
phrases and the absence of a clear statutory definition have resulted in
courts treating compactness as nothing more than a general require-
ment of fairness.74
The establishment of a state nonpartisan or bipartisan redistricting body has also been
suggested. See, e.g., Baker, One Person, One Vote: "Fair and Effective Representation?",
in REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION 89 (R. Goldwin ed. 1967); Dixon, supra note 5,
at 244; McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv.
223, 235-36 (1968). Although nonpartisan commissions may be less inclined to abuse the
redistricting power, it is unrealistic to believe that they would not be subjected to the
same political pressures and temptations that have affected legislatures. See Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). After a bipartisan Connecticut redistricting board drew
the 1972 state legislative redistricting lines, Republicans won 62 percent of the House seats
and 64 percent of the Senate seats with 53 percent of the popular vote.
69 Some courts have also recognized the value of compactness as a legislatively defined
requirement in districting. See, e.g., Wells v. Rockefeller, 894 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1969) (White,
J., dissenting); Wells v. Rockefeller, 278 F. Supp. 984, 991 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 389 U.S. 421
(1967); Drum v. Seawell, 250 F. Supp. 922, 925 (M.D.N.C. 1966).
70 By 1970, twenty states had constitutional compactness requirements for state legisla-
tive districts. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON AP-
PORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING (1971). ALAS. CONST. art VI, § 6; Asuz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2,
§ 1(1); COLO. CONST. art V, § 47, HAwAi CONST. art. III, § 4, 18; ILL. CONST. art. III, § 8(a);
IoWA CoNsr. art. III, § 84; MD. CONsr. art. III, § 4; MICH. CONSr. art. IV, §§ 2(2), (8) 2 &
§ 3, 4(2); Mo. CONST. art. III, § 2, 7 & § 8; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 8; NEB. CONSr. art. III,
§ 5; N.J. CONSr. art. IV, § II, 8; N.Y. CoNST. art. III, § 5, 4; OHIO CONSr. art. XI, § 7;
OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 9A; PA. CONsT. art. 1I, § 16; R.I. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 9- amend.
XIX, § 1; VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; WYo. CONST. art. III, § 49.
71 Act of Jan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, §§ 8, 4, 31 Stat. 783, 784; Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, § 8,
87 Stat. 13 (expired 1929). See Colgrove v. Green, 828 U.S. 549, 555 (1946); Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary [hereinafter cited as Hearings], 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 10, at 64 (1959) (testimony of Professor Kallenbach); R. BROOKS, POLI-
TICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL PROBLEMS 476 (1923); Baker, supra note 6, at 180-81; 28 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. No. 12, at 419-20 (Mar. 19, 1965); Mayhew, supra note 40, at 254. See also
the unenacted proposal discussed at note 67 supra.
72 See, e.g., HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 4, 18; R.I. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 & amend.
XIX, § 1. See also Opinion to the Governor, 101 R.I. 203, 210-11,221 A.2d 799, 808 (1966).
73 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 2, 7 & § 8.
74 E.g., People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti, 50 Ill. 2d 156, 166, 277 N.E.2d 881, 887 (1972);
Donovan v. Holzman, 8 Ill. 2d 87, 97, 182 N.E.2d 501, 507 (1956); Commonwealth ex rel.
Specter v. Levin, 448 Pa. 1, 17-19, 293 A.2d 15, 28-24 (1972). See Schwartzberg, Reappor-
tionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion of "Compactness", 50 MINN. L. REv. 448, 444
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Illinois, for example, has had various constitutional compactness pro-
visions since 1870. The Illinois compactness requirement was inter-
preted in 1895 in People ex. rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson.7 5 No defini-
tion was specified in the Illinois Constitution, so the court found that
"compact" meant "closely united." 76 Recognizing that this standard
was no more judicially manageable than the simple requirement that
districts be "compact," the court held:
There is a vast difference between determining whether the prin-
ciple of compactness of territory has been applied at all or not,
and whether or not the nearest practical approximation to perfect
compactness has been attained. The first is a question which the
courts may finally determine; the latter is for the legislature.77
Review of reapportionment plans under this type of vague standard
requires such deference to legislative judgments as to prohibit only
the most extreme examples of gerrymandering. A more explicit stand-
ard is necessary to minimize gerrymandering effectively.
A district has achieved maximum compactness when the greatest
distance between two points in the district cannot be reduced without
decreasing the total area of the district. Circular districts are therefore
the most compact. Circular districts, however, would exclude some per-
sons altogether, so a relative compactness standard is necessary. The
relative compactness of two districts can be measured by dividing the
perimeter of each district by the perimeter of a circle equal to the
district in area78 or by dividing the area of the district by the area of the
smallest possible circumscribing circle.79 Under either measurement,
(1966). However, see Annot., 2 A.L.R. 1337, 1858-59 (1919), for early twentieth century ex-
amples of judicial enforcement of state constitutional compactness provisions.
75 155 Ill. 451, 40 N.E. 307 (1895).
76 Id. at 478, 40 N.E. at 315.
77 Id. at 480, 40 N.E. at 315-16, cited with approval, Cousins v. City Council of Chi-
cago, 466 F.2d 830, 833-34 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
78 See Schwartzberg, supra note 74, at 446, where it is suggested that all districts with
an index of 1.67 or less be declared to be sufficiently compact.
7 See Roeck, Jr., Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative Apportion-
ment, 5 Minwasr J. POL. Sci. 70, 71 (1961). Roeck measured ninety districts of the 87th
Congress and determined that sixty-four of them achieved a degree of compactness in ex-
cess of 0.4. Id. at 73. Andrew Hacker has suggested that 0.4 may be a proper cutoff point
below which a district should be deemed to be noncompact. A. HACKER, supra note 86,
at 68. For further definitions of compactness, see Hearings, supra note 71; Harris, A Scien-
tific Method of Districting, 9 BEnAVIORAL Sei. 219 (1964); Taylor, A New Shape Measure
for Evaluating Electoral District Patterns, 67 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 947 (1973); Tyler & Wells,
The New Gerrymander Threat, AM. FDERATIONIST I, 7 (Feb. 1971); Vickery, On the Preven-
tion of Gerrymandering, 76 POL. 5CL Q. 105 (1961); Note, Compensatory Racial Reappor-
tionment, supra note 25, at 104 n.108.
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the closer the result, or "compactness index," is to one, the more com-
pact the district.
An accommodation between compactness and the "one person, one
vote" principle must be reached to allow for differences between popu-
lation densities and the contours of the boundaries of the various states.
An appropriate solution is to require all congressional district maps
to be drawn so as to minimize population variances among the districts
and to maximize the compactness of the districts. The state's lowest
possible compactness index would be the average of the indices of each
district in a districting plan drawn exclusively to minimize population
variances and maximize compactness.
Legislatures would have to use computers to determine the lowest
possible compactness index. 0 A de minimis variation should be per-
mitted so that the legislatures can correct minor difficulties, such as dis-
trict boundaries drawn in the middle of a block. If the permissible vari-
ance is too great, however, the legislature would regain a large degree
of the discretion that was withdrawn from it by the compactness re-
quirement. The permissible variation from the lowest possible com-
pactness index should be determined by Congress after empirical re-
search.
B. The Relationship between Compactness and Effective
Representation
The basic usefulness of the compactness standard is as a prophylactic
measure that limits the possibility of legislative gerrymandering and in-
creases the ability of courts to review districting plans. There is some
disagreement, however, as to whether compactness would unduly re-
duce effective representation by increasing homogeneity, thus de-
creasing the importance of the coalition-building process.,,
It is generally agreed that heterogeneous districts are conducive to
party competition. It is not at all clear, however, that a compactness
requirement would impair political heterogeneity.8 2 Compared to
gerrymandered districts, compact districts more effectively preserve
political heterogeneity, because they frustrate attempts to construct
safe districts for incumbents or isolate opposition votes in certain dis-
80 Computers, of course, could be used to print out the entire plan. See note 68 supra.
See also Sheth & Hess, Multiple Criteria in Political Redistricting: *Development of Rela-
tive Values, 2 RUTGERS J. CoMPuTERs & LAw 44, 50-53 (1971); Weaver & Hess, supra note
68, at 296-00.
81 See text and notes at notes 17-20 supra.
82 See, e.g., A. CAmPBELL & H. COOPER, GROUP DIFERENCES IN ATTITUDES AND VOTES
(1956); P. CouLTR & G. GORDON, VOTING BEHAVIOR IN MASSACHUSETrs (1967).
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tricts. The use of such techniques maximizes political homogeneity,
which, by definition, makes a district noncompetitive. Compact dis-
tricts would maximize only territorial continuity, and possibly ethnic,
racial, or economic homogeneity.
Members of the same ethnic, racial, and economic groups do not
always live in close geographic proximity.83 Even where this proximity
exists, compactness does not necessarily increase political homogeneity.
Within each group, members will hold a wide variety of views on
political questions, and in a large city, a compact district will usually
contain parts of a number of diverse communities. 8'
Effective representation is reduced only if candidates do not need to
build and rebuild coalitions within their districts in order to main-
tain their seats. This unresponsiveness is unlikely to arise in a district
not created precisely for that purpose. A compactness standard is there-
fore not only preferable to gerrymandering but also no more likely
to result in reduced effectiveness of representation than any other ob-
jective standard for drawing district lines. Such a standard is more ad-
ministratively workable than the alternatives and also promotes com-
petitive elections by facilitating transportation and media access within
the district.
C. Respect for Political Subdivision Boundaries
Rare situations may arise in which giving weight to factors other than
compactness would increase the effectiveness of representation-for
example, where the use of traditionally significant political subdivision
lines would improve the electoral process.85 A geographic unit may have
a long and important tradition as an electoral unit, with practices or or-
ganizations that play important roles in facilitating political debate
and voter participation. Highly active reform groups and voters' leagues
are examples of such organizations.8 6 Noncompactness might be justified
by a showing that it is essential to preserve important traditional
political subdivisions, but the burden would be on the legislature to
show that the subdivision lines were selected because of their historic
importance and that the historic importance was a neutral criterion aid-
83 See Mayhew, supra note 40, at 273.
84 According to one commentator, the "urban center contains a wide spectrum of
party, factional, social, economic, and other differences that hardly comprise a monolithic
interest." Baker, supra note 68, at 77-78; see Neal, supra note 27, at 279. But see T. DYE,
PoLrTmcs, EcONOmiVcs, AND TmE PuBuc 57 (1966).
85 See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
86 Political parties are, of course, such groups, but to permit legislatures to use the
strength of party organizations to determine districting lines would defeat the purpose of
enacting a compactness requirement. The exception should therefore be limited to non-
partisan groups.
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ing the electoral process, rather than a camouflage for gerrymandering.
Respect for other factors, such as access to area-wide communications,
might arguably also justify a deviation from compactness. However, in
order for compactness to serve its prophylactic function, legislative dis-
cretion must be severely limited, and therefore justifications for non-
compactness should be restricted to respect for traditional political
subdivisions. A statute requiring compactness should also permit any
person qualified to vote in a congressional election to bring an action
to enforce the statute in his state. This would allow the voter to bring
suit to enforce the statute without requiring him to prove discrimina-
tion against an identifiable group of which he is a member.8 7
The statute proposed in this comment allows some legislative discre-
tion with respect to protection of traditional political subdivisions, but
would prevent the legislatures from using their districting power to
protect the seats of incumbents or to increase the holdings of the dom-
inant party. The statute also allows the courts to remedy the serious in-
justice of gerrymandering without exceeding the institutional and con-
stitutional limits of their competence. Most important, the statute
would bring the electoral system a step closer to "fair and effective repre-
sentation for all citizens."
Robert S. Stern
87 See text and notes at notes 51-57 supra.
